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BREWING BETTER LAW: TWO PROPOSALS TO 
ENCOURAGE INNOVATION IN AMERICA’S  
CRAFT BEER INDUSTRY 
ANDREW D’AVERSA† 
The craft beer industry is one of the most innovative industries in America. Craft 
brewers blend tradition, regional tastes, and artistry to make some of the best beers in 
the world. Against all odds, the craft brewing business has boomed in an outmoded and 
ill-fitting regulatory environment. As more countries—and multinational brewers—follow 
in the footsteps of American craft brewers by cultivating their own fledgling markets, the 
fragile international dominance of our industry is threatened by our own stifling rules. 
This Comment proposes two methods that state and federal governments can use to 
spur competition and thus innovation. First, the federal excise tax should match the 
size of the brewer. Tax rates must be reduced to lower a significant barrier to entry for 
the smallest brewers. Second, all states should allow brewpubs to operate with direct 
sales and reasonable barrelage limits. Barrelage limits threaten growth without 
furthering a legitimate regulatory purpose. These two small changes in federal and 
state law will lower barriers to entry, improve the odds of success for existing craft 
brewers, and create more competition—innovation follows. Importantly, for the regulators 
and legislators, these changes can coexist harmoniously with the current, post-Prohibition 
moral framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Our hunter–gatherer ancestors grew fond of beer many thousands of years 
ago.1 As that fondness grew into obsession, an agricultural society bent on 
brewing was born.2 In other words, human civilization may owe a debt to 
beer. In terms of the fundamentals, not much has changed since the invention 
of beer.3 Although the brewing process may have lost much of its mystique 
with the advent of modern science,4 it certainly has not diminished in 
 
1 See Abigail Tucker, Smithsonian Magazine, The Beer Archaeologist, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Aug. 
2011), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-beer-archaeologist-17016372/?no-ist [http://perma.cc/
X4UF-YQQC] (explaining how a scientist, Dr. Patrick McGovern, has dated the world’s oldest known 
barley beer to 3400 BCE, about 2000 years after the world’s oldest known grape wine). 
2 See Solomon H. Katz & Mary M. Voigt, Bread and Beer: The Early Use of Cereals in the Human 
Diet, EXPEDITION, Aug. 1986, at 23, 27 (suggesting that because fermentation of cooked barley and 
wheat led to altered consciousness and better nutrition, humans began domesticating wild grains—the 
de facto basis of civilization—in order to brew more beer). But see William K. Stevens, Does Civilization 
Owe a Debt to Beer?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/24/science/does-
civilization-owe-a-debt-to-beer.html [https://perma.cc/QJ4BL6QQ] (explaining that others have 
questioned the Katz-and-Voigt hypothesis since “[s]trong motivation would have been required to 
break away from the hunting–gathering way of life . . . because . . . [it] provided a higher and more 
reliable standard of living”). 
3 See CHARLIE PAPAZIAN, THE COMPLETE JOY OF HOMEBREWING 10 (4th ed. 2014) 
(“Nevertheless, the fundamental factors that have influenced the taste of American beer and that of 
beer throughout the world haven’t changed in more than 4,500 years!”). 
4 See WILLIAM BOSTWICK, THE BREWER’S TALE: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD ACCORDING 
TO BEER 2, 221 (2014) (describing how Louis Pasteur—in his 1876 treatise, Studies on Fermentation—was 
the first person to scientifically explain the function of yeast and its effect on brewing, something that 
was, until that point, considered almost magic). 
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popularity. According to a recent survey, beer accounts for approximately 40 
of the 55.4 liters—or 10.5 of the 14.6 gallons—of alcoholic beverages consumed 
per capita around the globe.5 Based on those dominating numbers, the global 
beer industry netted $33 billion in profits in 2014.6 To get a sense of the 
massive scale of one of the global players, the newly merged7 Anheuser-Busch 
InBev–SABMiller rivals Nestlé as one of largest consumer products companies 
in the world—based solely on the sale of beer.8 
America is no different than the rest of the world in its long-and-storied 
love affair with beer. In Philadelphia, for example, brewing “dated from the 
1600s and originated with William Penn.”9 Perhaps excepting the South, most 
states have very similar brewing stories dating from similar times because of 
their shared English provenance.10 Americans still enjoy a good brew, at least 
comparatively, ranking just outside of the top ten countries in beer consumption 
per capita.11 According to the Beer Institute, a beer industry lobby, and the 
National Beer Wholesalers Association, a beer distribution lobby, America’s 
brewing industry contributes about $252 billion in total economic impact per 
year.12 In addition to that economic impact are approximately $37 billion in 
 
5 See Booze Around the World, ECONOMIST (July 25, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/
business/21659754-booze-around-world [https://perma.cc/CV2M-N5JX] (depicting in a graph global 
alcohol “intake per head of the drinking-age population”). This equates to about 113 twelve-fluid-ounce 
bottles of beer a year. 
6 See Corey Stern, These 4 Companies Produce Almost Half of the World’s Beer. . . and Make 74% 
of the Profits, BUS. INSIDER (June 24, 2015, 4:47 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/beer-industry-
consolidation-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/PB38-LYMW] (citing data that Anheuser-Busch, InBev, SABMiller, 
Heineken, and Carlsberg “control about 74%[] of the industry’s . . . global profits”). 
7 Tara Nurin, It’s Final: AB InBev Closes on Deal to Buy SABMiller, FORBES (Oct. 10, 2016, 7:55 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/taranurin/2016/10/10/its-final-ab-inbev-closes-on-deal-to-buy-sabmiller 
[https://perma.cc/KLQ5-9DAW]. 
8 See Tripp Mickle & Saabira Chaudhuri, AB InBev’s SABMiller Deal Still Faces Hurdles, WALL 
STREET J. (Nov. 11, 2015, 7:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ab-inbev-sabmiller-formalize-106-
billion-deal-1447230611 [https://perma.cc/VQ8S-665D]. 
9 AMY MITTELMAN, BREWING BATTLES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN BEER 20 (2008). 
10 See, e.g., BOSTWICK, supra note 4, at 176 (quoting a letter from Captain Thomas Walduck—“a 
traveler and military man stationed in British Barbados”—in which he wrote that “the first thing ye 
English do, be it in the most remote part of ye world . . . is to set up a tavern or drinking house”); 
MITTELMAN, supra note 9, at 9 (“Beer was never as popular in the Southern colonies or states because of 
its propensity to spoil in warm weather.”). 
11 See Raziye Akkoc, Beer Sales Around the World – Who Drinks the Most?, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 18, 
2014, 2:08 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/leisure/11237013/
Mapped-Beer-sales-around-the-world-who-drinks-the-most.html [https://perma.cc/R38P-8KBP] (showing 
that American drinkers consume seventy-three liters per capita, trailing traditional beer-drinking 
countries—such as the Czech Republic, Germany, Austria, Ireland, and Belgium—but ahead of the 
United Kingdom). 
12 See State Legislative and Congressional District Data, BEER SERVES AM., http://www. 
beerservesamerica.org/state-and-congressional-district-data [https://perma.cc/N52Z-BJXA] (click on 
“Economic Impact Report”; then select “view” to download report) (calculating that the brewing 
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federal, state, and local business-and-personal taxes, as well as $11 billion in 
federal, state, and local consumption taxes.13 While some may prefer wine or 
harder liquors, beer still remains the undisputed king of the American fridge 
and barroom.14 
Most important in the current United States beer scene is the craft beer 
movement. The craft beer revolution of the mid-1960s15 is a certified national 
phenomenon that shows no signs of slowing down.16 The numbers indicate that 
America’s affections seem to be shifting from “Big Beer” (like Bud, Miller, and 
Coors), which has dominated the beer scene since the 1950s,17 back toward smaller 
local and regional brewers.18 In some ways, the craft movement is really a return 
to America’s pre-Prohibition roots.19 
Even if the numbers are not persuasive, some anecdotal examples may be. 
Budweiser has recently taken the craft beer threat more seriously in a very public 
way. Budweiser’s aggressive advertisements on America’s biggest advertising 
stage, the Super Bowl,20 were singularly focused on challenging the values of 
 
industry directly creates approximately 50,000 jobs and another 936,000 throughout the wholesaling 
and retailing sectors). 
13 Id. 
14 See MITTELMAN, supra note 9, at 1 (“Some 84 million Americans drink beer. This is more 
people than drink milk, according to some estimates.”); Zac Auter, Beer Reigns as Americans’ Preferred 
Alcoholic Beverage, GALLUP (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/194144/beer-reigns-americans-
preferred-alcoholic-beverage.aspx [https://perma.cc/BJ8W-54DN] (finding that “[b]eer continues to 
edge out wine [and] liquor as [the] preferred alcoholic drink”). 
15 See TOM ACITELLI, THE AUDACITY OF HOPS: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA’S CRAFT BEER 
REVOLUTION 9-11 (2013) (placing the beginnings of the craft beer movement in the 1960s at Fritz 
Maytag’s Anchor Brewery). 
16 But see Jim Koch, Is It Last Call for Craft Beer?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.nytimes.
com/2017/04/07/opinion/is-it-last-call-for-craft-beer.html [https://perma.cc/9J9N-9ZKJ] (detailing 
sluggish growth, consolidation of brewers and wholesalers, and Big Beer’s craft acquisitions as 
serious threats to craft beer’s continuing viability). 
17 See ACITELLI, supra note 15, at 8 (“By the start of 1959, the five largest breweries produced 
over 28 percent of the beer Americans consumed, a jump of ten percentage points since the end of 
World War II. That market share would grow to nearly half within a decade . . . .”). 
18 See, e.g., Economic Impact, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/
economic-impact-data [https://perma.cc/38XZ-3LZ5] (finding that in 2014, craft breweries contributed 
$55.7 billion in total economic impact and 115,000 American jobs at breweries and brewpubs); Stats & 
FAQs, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-room/stats-faqs [https://perma.cc/
4A4C-UM6F] (determining that craft beer accounted for 12.3% by volume and 21.9% of the market 
share of the United States beer market in 2016, an increase in both metrics since 2015). 
19 See Bart Watson, U.S. Passes 4,000 Breweries, BREWERS ASS’N (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www. 
brewersassociation.org/insights/4000-breweries [https://perma.cc/EP38-RVSB] (stating that, as of 
September 2015, there were more than 4000 craft breweries in America—only 131 fewer than the 
record seen in 1873—and that most Americans live within ten miles of a local brewery). 
20 See Andie Hagemann, Super Bowl 50 Most-Watched Program in TV History, NFL, http://www. 
nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000634876/article/super-bowl-50-mostwatched-program-in-tv-history 
[https://perma.cc/HN3D-8QSF] (last updated Feb. 8, 2016, 6:26 PM). 
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the craft beer industry and craft beer itself.21 Additionally, Budweiser added 
multiple craft brewers to its stable of brands.22 Miller has, ever since its 
acquisition of Coors, created its own “craft beer” brand hidden under the 
guise of Blue Moon.23 
Finally, consider the success of two craft beer vanguards. Both Yuengling, 
a once-weary survivor from the regional brewer days, and Sierra Nevada, a 
1980 upstart craft brewer, have eclipsed the one-million-barrel mark and have 
made billionaires of their owners.24 The American craft beer industry rightfully 
is the envy of the global beer market.25 
Craft beer is important to America both economically and culturally. 
Unfortunately, the law has largely ignored craft beer’s impact. Only a few articles 
addressing specific state laws, international comparative law, and brewpubs have 
ever addressed the craft beer phenomenon.26 Of course, there is much more at 
 
21 See Brad Tuttle, Budweiser Doubles Down by Mocking Craft Beer Again in Super Bowl Ad, 
TIME: MONEY (Feb. 6, 2016), http://time.com/money/4210344/budweiser-super-bowl-50-ad-mock-craft-
beer [https://perma.cc/9M9L-R6AQ] (describing Bud’s 2016 Super Bowl advertisement, which said 
that Bud is “not small” and its beer is “not a fruit cup” (capitalization omitted)); see also budweiser, 
Budweiser USA: #BestBuds | 2015 Budweiser Clydesdale Beer Run, YOUTUBE (Jan. 23, 2015), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=EIUSkKTUftU [https://perma.cc/4GUG-Q5ZH] (depicting a Clydesdale 
horse, the Bud mascot, intimidating a shopper into putting down craft beer and buying Budweiser). 
22 Anheuser-Busch InBev recently added Wicked Weed to its stable of craft brands, which 
includes Elysian, Devils Backbone, Blue Point, and Karbach Brewing Co. John Kell, Anheuser-Busch 
InBev Just Bought Its 10th Craft Brewer, FORTUNE (May 3, 2017), http://fortune.com/2015/05/03/
abinbev-tenth-craft-brewer-deal [https://perma.cc/A2MH-EN4L]. 
23 Blue Moon has been so well-hidden that it was alleged that Miller’s use of the label caused 
consumer confusion. Complaint at 3, Parent v. MillerCoors LLC, No. 3:15-cv-1204-GPC-WVG (S.D. 
Cal. June 16, 2016). As a result, the company was the subject of a consumer class action in California 
concerning alleged fraudulent advertising. Id.; see also ACITELLI, supra note 15, at 206 (quoting craft beer 
industry players as saying that this type of business model, “phantom micros” or “phantom crafts,” is “a 
particularly insidious—and ingenious—threat in the marketplace”). 
24 KEN GROSSMAN, BEYOND THE PALE: THE STORY OF SIERRA NEVADA BREWING CO. 45 
(2013); see also Brendan Coffey, Sierra Nevada Founder Grossman Becomes Billionaire on Pale Ales, 
BLOOMBERGPURSUITS (Jan. 20, 2015, 4:59 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-20/
sierra-nevada-founder-grossman-becomes-billionaire-on-pale-ales [https://perma.cc/46KC-U5VT] 
(explaining that Ken Grossman is now “the head of the country’s second-largest craft brewery, becoming 
a billionaire in the process, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index”); Brendan Coffey, Yuengling 
Tapping Thirst for Craft Beers, BLADE (Dec. 23, 2012), http://www.toledoblade.com/Nation/2012/12/23/
Yuengling-Billionaire-Beats-Sam-Adams-With-Craft-Brews.html [https://perma.cc/ATZ5-22F3] (“As the 
company’s value soared in the past decade amid a surge in demand for craft brews, Yuengling became 
a billionaire.”). 
25 See GROSSMAN, supra note 24, at 97 (“For the past 30 years, the US brewing industry has 
been the global leader in brewing innovation and has seen the establishment of thousands of new 
brands . . . . The American brewing revolution serves as a model that is being emulated around the 
world and has affected the global beer marketplace in amazing ways.”). 
26 See Kincaid C. Brown, Michigan Craft Beer Legislation, MICH. B.J., July 2015, at 54; Josh 
Hunsucker, Read My Lips, No Inappropriate Beer Taxes: Chapter 96 Amends the Definition of Beer, 
Protecting Craft Brewers, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 543 (2013); Tammy Lam, Note, Brew Free or Die? 
A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and E.U. Craft Beer Regulations, 23 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
197 (2014); David R. Scott, Comment, Brewing Up a New Century of Beer: How North Carolina Laws 
1470 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1465 
the intersection of craft beer and the law than merely these few topics. One could 
imagine articles addressing stabilization and regulation of the hop market,27 
bottling and process technology,28 and the monopolies held by large brewers and 
wholesalers.29 This Comment seeks to amend the deficiency by addressing 
another important aspect at the core of the craft beer movement: innovation.30 
While innovation may be measured in many ways, this Comment will focus 
only on the creation of new beer recipes. 
Before focusing on how to create those new recipes, however, there is one 
important question left to answer: does America need more craft beer? To 
many consumers, a list full of different bottles and a bevy of taps seems to be 
enough to sate even the most insatiable beer connoisseur. But several reasons 
cut against this argument. First, to keep America’s craft brewing edge, 
America must not favor entrenched competitors but instead keep its brewers 
in constant competition. Generally, any changes that reduce barriers to entry 
allow for more competition, lower prices, and better quality.31 Second, 
comparing the craft beer industry to the wine industry, beer still lags far 
behind wine in overall producers,32 even though beer is a much bigger 
industry by volume sold.33 This indicates that craft beer has not yet hit its 
 
Stifle Competition in the Beer Industry and How They Should Be Changed, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 
417 (2013); Andrew Tamayo, Comment, What’s Brewing in the Old North State: An Analysis of the Beer 
Distribution Laws Regulating North Carolina’s Craft Breweries, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2198 (2010); Justin M. 
Welch, Note, The Inevitability of the Brewpub: Legal Avenues for Expanding Distribution Capabilities, 16 
REV. LITIG. 173 (1997). 
27 The hop market is one of those rare markets in which there is only one profitable (or even 
desired) use: beer. See GROSSMAN, supra note 24, at 77-79 (discussing the volatility of the hop market 
based on crop size and its pressure on craft brewers who are usually spot buyers and therefore most 
affected by the shifting fortunes of the market). 
28 The questions here would be who is researching bottle technology, can craft brewer’s 
experiment with it, and is it widely accessible for adoption. See, e.g., id. at 225 (noting that a switch 
from twist-off to pry-off caps exponentially improves shelf stability and flavor of the beer). 
29 See Mickle & Chaudhuri, supra note 8 (estimating that before their merger, Anheuser-Busch 
InBev and SABMiller together controlled 30% of the global market for beer). 
30 See Craft Brewer Defined, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/craft-
brewer-defined [https://perma.cc/SPP8-6C84] (“The hallmark of craft beer and craft brewers is innovation.”). 
31 See MATTHEW MITCHELL & CHRISTOPHER KOOPMAN, MERCATUS CTR. GEORGE 
MASON UNIV., MERCATUS ON POLICY: BOTTLING UP INNOVATION IN CRAFT BREWING: A 
REVIEW OF THE CURRENT BARRIERS AND CHALLENGES 1 (2014), https://www.mercatus.org/system/
files/MitchellKoopman-CraftBrewing-MOP.pdf [https://perma.cc/MKG4-VFLM] (“Startups in the 
craft brewing industry face formidable barriers to entry in the form of federal, state, and local 
regulations. These barriers limit competition and innovation, reducing consumer welfare.”). 
32 Compare Stats & FAQs, supra note 18 (showing that there were 5301 breweries in 2016), with 
Wines & Vines Staff, Number of Wineries Grows to 8,391 in North America, WINES & VINES (Jan. 27, 
2014), http://www.winesandvines.com/template.cfm?section=news&content=127266 [https://perma. 
cc/6SEC-C487] (stating that there were 7762 wineries in the United States in 2013). 
33 See Doug Schwalm, Taxation and the Economic Impacts of Alcohol (“By 1990, just over 50 percent 
of ethanol consumed in the United States was in the form of beer, with the rest being almost equally 
split between wine and spirits.”), in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ALCOHOL: THE 21ST 
2017] Brewing Better Law 1471 
market saturation point. Surely, one would not argue that wine lists have 
become too long; many restaurants see these tomes as a point of pride. What 
meaningful differentiation could be made for craft beer? Third, the craft 
brewing industry not only creates more jobs but also spurs tourism.34 Craft 
beer is one of the last vestiges of regional culinary diversity left in America 
and should be supported solely on that basis. Finally, after venture capital left 
its mark in the mid-1990s craft beer IPO craze, the craft brew bubble righted 
itself.35 This is a sustainable industry that has continued to see double-digit 
growth.36 The government should not impede the creation of good jobs in 
small businesses around the country. 
The reason for focusing on recipe creation is simple. Recipes are the 
lifeblood of the craft beer movement. When one thinks of craft beer’s effect 
on the American beer industry, one naturally thinks of the many exciting 
twists craft brewers have taken on traditional recipes. Take, for example, the 
India Pale Ale. The IPA was first popularized in nineteenth-century Britain 
as an alternative to the heavy—and sometimes poisonous—stouts and 
porters.37 Now, whether it is a black IPA, rye IPA, or otherwise “IPA-ized” 
beer, IPAs are ubiquitous.38 What was “bitter” is now—positively—“hoppy.” 
Consider as well the modern pumpkin beer, a recalibration of an American 
ale born of rebellion and necessity, which has a very similar creation story to 
the IPA.39 The innovative recipe, which differentiates a craft brewer from the 
 
AMENDMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 19, 20 (Carole L. Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter eds., 2008) 
[hereinafter SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ALCOHOL]. 
34 For example, Asheville, North Carolina now holds itself out as having more breweries per 
capita than any other city in the United States and advertises that fact to promote tourism. See Beer 
Scene, ASHEVILLE, http://www.exploreasheville.com/foodtopia/beer-scene [http://perma.cc/FH44-
G2Q4] (boasting about having roughly 100 local beers). 
35 See ACITELLI, supra note 15, at 265-67, 294 (discussing how Wall Street’s entrance into craft 
beer created beer “of dubious quality” and ended in “The Great Shakeout,” as well as how those 
brewers who survived the Great Shakeout fared in the early 2000s); BOSTWICK, supra note 4, at 233 
(“Between 1996 and 2000 three hundred recently opened breweries shut down.”). 
36 See National Beer Sales & Production Data 2015, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.
org/statistics/national-beer-sales-production-data [https://perma.cc/X9WS-A7H8] (calculating that 
craft beer sales grew 12.8% in 2015). But see National Beer Sales & Production Data 2016, BREWERS 
ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/national-beer-sales-production-data [https://perma.
cc/FHL6-NSYB] (determining that 2016 growth in the industry was only 6.2% by volume). 
37 See BOSTWICK, supra note 4, at 135-36 (discussing the rise of the IPA in England, where it 
was first marketed as the “healthy, temperate” alternative to “rich, thick stouts and porters”). 
38 See Bart Watson, What’s the Next IPA?, BREWERS ASS’N (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.
brewersassociation.org/insights/the-next-ipa [https://perma.cc/FN5D-D7XF] (discussing the meteoric 
rise and influence of the IPA on America’s craft brewers and showing that Americans consumed seven 
million barrels of this craft style in 2015). 
39 See BOSTWICK, supra note 4, at 178-79 (telling how early American brewers used pumpkin, 
spruce, and molasses—among other strange ingredients—to make beer); BUFFALO BILL’S BREWERY, 
http://buffalobillsbrewery.com [https://perma.cc/2DCP-P3FJ] (claiming that it created “America’s 
Original Pumpkin Ale” in 1985 using “real pumpkin and spices”). 
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bubbly sea of Big Beer’s lagers, is what sets the craft brewer apart. What 
primarily brings people back is not the price, the packaging, or the availability, 
but the taste.40 The craft brewer is an artisan, combining the brewer’s art, 
modern science, and time-tested tradition in the process of creation. For this 
Comment’s purposes, it matters not what the next great recipe might be,41 but 
how we can encourage the recipe to exit the ether and enter the bottle before it 
is lost forever. 
There are two main ways in which new recipes can be created, and each of the 
proposals in this Comment aims to encourage those methods of recipe creation. 
The first option is creating new breweries. Lowering a barrier to entry should 
encourage the establishment of new breweries, which create new recipes and 
new house flavors.42 The first proposal thus aims to lower one significant 
barrier, excise taxes on the smallest breweries. The second option is to create 
more profitable and longer-lasting breweries, which tend to experiment and 
expand their repertoires. The second proposal—legalizing brewpubs or, at 
least, legalizing direct sales from breweries to patrons—puts more money 
directly in the pockets of brewers and may encourage long-term investment 
and experimentation. After discussing the basic backdrop of beer regulation, 
this Comment will delve into each proposal. 
I. A LEGAL HISTORY OF BREWING: FROM  
NEAR BEER TO CRAFT BEER 
A. Alcohol Regulation After Prohibition 
Of all the products humans have devised, alcohol is the only one that has 
been the subject of two constitutional amendments.43 Over our country’s 
history, attitudes about alcohol have swung wildly from life-giving necessity 
to banned substance and finally back to acceptable social drink.44 Beer floats 
 
40 See ACITELLI, supra note 15, at 110-11 (describing craft beer as a “connoisseur thing”); id. at 
120-21 (illustrating the conception of a beer tasting event that featured craft beer at the Brickskeller 
in Washington, D.C.); id. at 264 (explaining that craft beer appealed to foodies); id. at 296-98 (quoting 
a speech at the 2002 Craft Brewers Conference during which it was stated that “craft brewers [we]re 
[brewing] ‘beer as wine’”). 
41 One industry observer guesses that blondes, Kölsches, goldens, sours, or goses might be the 
next big seller. Watson, supra note 38. 
42 New breweries bring with them, as a matter of course, new flavors just by using different 
water, supplies, equipment, and environment. See, e.g., BOSTWICK, supra note 4, at 173-74 (describing 
how one home brewer’s “house flavor”—that is, the one constant flavor across all beers made—is 
smoky because he uses traditional methods over an open wood fire to brew beer). 
43 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
44 See Carole L. Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter, Why We Control Alcohol the Way We Do 
(constructing a historical timeline from the first European settlement until the end of Prohibition 
in the United States, delineating the variation in American attitudes and laws on liquor), in SOCIAL 
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on the social and political currents of America and is subject to the ever-changing 
status of alcohol in our culture.45 The height of fear and social disapproval of 
alcohol was undoubtedly during the Eighteenth Amendment’s ratification 
and Prohibition, when the sale of alcoholic beverages was completely 
abolished nationwide.46 Soon, America realized that even if Prohibition was 
a grand experiment, it was a failed one.47 John D. Rockefeller, Jr., a staunch 
teetotaler, recognized the fact, saying, “[T]he regrettable failure of the Eighteenth 
Amendment has demonstrated the fact that the majority of the people of this 
country are not yet ready for total abstinence, at least when it is attempted 
through legal coercion.”48 Even if Prohibition was not the answer to alcohol 
regulation, American government was reluctant to return to an ineffective 
pre-Prohibition scheme. A compromise between complete control and laissez-faire 
pre-Prohibition laws was necessary. The Twenty-First Amendment handed the 
problem of alcohol regulation to the states, but it provided no overall direction 
on implementation.49 
John D. Rockefeller, Jr., through the influential study he funded, attempted 
to fill the regulatory gap. Rockefeller, Jr. asked Raymond Fosdick, a lawyer, 
and Albert Scott, an engineer “who ha[d] also devoted much time and thought 
to the intensive study of social and religious movements,” to define the aspirations 
 
AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ALCOHOL, supra note 33, at 1, 3-5; cf. MITTELMAN, supra note 9, 
at 1 (“In early modern Europe people considered beer essential for good health.”). In fact, today, a 
large portion of the country does not drink. See Auter, supra note 14 (surveying American attitudes 
toward alcohol and finding that about 35% of Americans state they abstain from alcohol). 
45 America has still not reached a consensus on a unified social, moral, or cultural definition of 
alcohol. On the one hand, alcohol is revered in American culture. It is an integral part of many 
holidays and is seen as a rite of passage into adulthood. On the other hand, state and federal 
governments regulate alcohol as if it were a dangerous toxin and place strong, moral disapprobation 
upon it. This clash of society, morality, and law may be the key to understanding the strange state 
of alcohol regulation. See Abraham M. Buchman, Foreword to SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL 
OF ALCOHOL, supra note 33, at xiii, xiii-xv (discussing the intersection of religion, culture, and the 
law as it relates to alcohol control); Jurkiewicz & Painter, supra note 44, at 14 (“Today, as in the past, 
alcohol remains a controversial and divisive topic. Its use is inextricable from concerns about health, 
crime, and politics.”). 
46 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (“After one year from the ratification of this article the 
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or 
the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof 
for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.”), repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
47 See RAYMOND B. FOSDICK & ALBERT L. SCOTT, TOWARD LIQUOR CONTROL 4-5 (Ctr. for 
Alcohol Policy 2011) (1933) (“[U]p to the adoption of the Prohibition Amendment of 1920 . . . we have 
attempted to impose on law a burden which law by itself is not equipped to carry . . . . Permanent 
advance in human society cannot be brought about by night-sticks and patrol wagons. Men cannot 
be made good by force.”). 
48 John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Foreword to FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 47, at xiii, xiii. 
49 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any state, 
territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in 
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”). 
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and policies of a new era of alcohol regulation.50 More than eighty years later, 
this study, entitled Toward Liquor Control, is considered to have “done more 
to shape modern American alcohol policy than any other book except the 
Bible.”51 Toward Liquor Control not only motivated officials’ policy choices 
during the period immediately after Prohibition but also remains a strong 
influence today.52 Its arguments still undergird modern state laws and 
motivate state legislators.53 
The proposed regulatory scheme advocated by Fosdick and Scott was a 
state-controlled monopoly on alcohol retail—in the best case—or, at least, a 
three-tier licensure system.54 Both proposals were meant to incorporate six 
aspirations, the most important of which was to drive out the “criminal 
element” in alcohol manufacture, distribution, and sale.55 But, even before 
the mob came to the fore during Prohibition, a more pernicious problem 
existed. Many suppliers of alcohol either had direct control of retail outlets 
or used various coercive tactics that straitjacketed retailers into selling as much of 
one brand as possible.56 This so-called bare profit motive was thought to be both 
a dangerous restraint of the free market and a cause of alcoholism and its related 
social ills.57 For its part, the federal government passed a “tied-house” statute, 
which prohibits meddling by producers in retailers’ affairs.58 Today, every state 
has layered on its own tied house restrictions in one fashion or another.59 
In addition, every state has adopted one of the plans that Fosdick and Scott 
suggested. A minority of states has chosen to create a state-controlled monopoly 
 
50 Rockefeller, Jr., supra note 48, at xiv. 
51 Jim Petro et al., Introduction to FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 47, at vii, vii. 
52 Id. at vii-xi. 
53 Id. at x. 
54 See FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 47, at 24-68 (proposing two systems to control beer, 
wine, and liquor—either regulation by license or “the authority plan,” which allowed the state a 
monopoly over wholesale or retail of alcohol). 
55 See id. at 9-10 (envisioning, as well, moderate use of alcohol, prohibition of saloons, decreased 
alcohol industry influence on government, other limitations on the sale of liquor, and a solution to 
regulation of alcohol). 
56 See id. at 29 (blaming drunkenness, in part, on tied houses, which were motivated to sell as 
much alcohol as possible because they could only sell one brand). The so-called tied-house problem still 
exists in many other parts of the world. See GROSSMAN, supra note 24, at 95 (“In other parts of Europe 
and the world, it’s common practice for brewers or distributors to cut exclusive deals with bars and 
restaurants and provide tables, chairs, [etc.] . . . in exchange for exclusivity in the brands the retailer sells.”). 
57 FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 47, at 29. 
58 See 27 U.S.C. § 205(a) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in business as a 
distiller, brewer, [etc.] . . . to prevent, deter, hinder, or restrict other persons from selling or offering 
for sale any such products to such retailer in interstate or foreign commerce . . . .”). 
59 Each state prohibits, in some form, a manufacturer from “providing an item of value to a 
retailer.” Susan C. Cagann, Contents Under Pressure: Regulating the Sales and Marketing of Alcoholic 
Beverages, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ALCOHOL, supra note 33, at 57, 65. 
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over the wholesale or retail of certain types of alcohol.60 Since it is state-run, this 
method gives the state governments the most control over what is sold, when it 
is sold, who can buy it, and in what amounts. Although this plan led to less 
consumption, some states remained unwilling to exercise this amount of control.61 
Instead, the remaining states rejected the monopoly system and imposed 
Fosdick and Scott’s three-tier licensing system.62 The three-tier system goes a 
step further than tied-house laws and requires manufacturers, wholesalers, and 
retailers to be distinct entities.63 A retailer, for example, may not also hold a 
license as a producer and vice versa. In other words, this system creates an 
unassailable buffer between producer and retailer by requiring independent 
wholesalers. While there have been challenges to this arrangement,64 the 
strength of the wholesalers’ lobby65 has predictably stalled any major change to 
the system.66 It is within the wholesalers’ interests to keep their protected 
statuses as middlemen, even though changes in the market may have mitigated 
their necessity.67 Exceptions exist. Some states have allowed the melding of 
 
60 New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Utah control both the wholesale and retail levels for the 
sale of wine, fortified wine, and liquor. Evan T. Lawson, The Future of the Three-Tiered System as a 
Control of Marketing Alcoholic Beverages, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ALCOHOL, supra 
note 33, at 31, 33. Mississippi and Wyoming control only the wholesale level for the same products. Id. 
Idaho, Michigan, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington control the 
wholesale and retail levels for fortified wine and liquor sales. Id. Alabama, Iowa, Maine, Virginia, and 
West Virginia only control the wholesale level for the same products. Id. 
61 See Terrel L. Rhodes, Policy, Regulation, and Legislation, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL 
OF ALCOHOL, supra note 33, at 79, 83 (“[W]hen states move from a control system to a licensure 
system . . . overall sale[s] of alcoholic beverages increase[] significantly.”). 
62 Lawson, supra note 60, at 33-34. 
63 Id. at 31. 
64 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 26, at 432-35 (advocating for a complete abolition of the three-tier 
system because of the creation of wholesaler monopolies and restrictions on consumer choice); 
David White, Wholesale Robbery in Liquor Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/04/04/opinion/04white.html [https://perma.cc/UR8W-RDD7] (attacking the wholesaler lobby 
for raising consumer prices by 18-25% and restricting consumer choice). 
65 See Amanda Becker, Law and Lobbying Firms Pump Millions of Dollars into Midterm Campaigns, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/29/AR2010
102905908.html [https://perma.cc/RDF9-29JC] (determining that the National Beer Wholesalers Association 
was among the top donors in the 2010 election cycle, contributing about $7 million to “Democratic 
and Republican candidates ‘who understand the importance of state-based alcohol regulation’”). 
66 Furthermore, state legislatures may not embrace the change since this directly contradicts the 
three-tier system. To break the power of the wholesaler is to essentially abandon the system and revert to 
private control. See FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 47, at 29 (describing the licensure system as a means 
to control the “tied house” problem by fully separating the manufacturer and retailer). 
67 See MITCHELL & KOOPMAN, supra note 31, at 4 (“While initially justified on public interest 
grounds, the three-tier system has created an entrenched interest (distributors) that now has a financial 
stake in seeing that these policies persist.”). 
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producer-and-retailer or producer-and-wholesaler for small-scale brewers.68 
These exceptions will be addressed further in Part III. 
The last segment of the system is the “beer franchise law.” These laws regulate 
the contractual relationship between the producer and the wholesaler and adjust 
contract law to favor the wholesaler.69 While these laws vary by state, in general 
they are built on the mistaken assumption that brewers are large and national 
while wholesalers are small and local.70 Based on this assumption, these laws’ 
default provisions require “good cause” for termination, sixty- or ninety-day 
notice-and-cure provisions, and exclusive territory grants to wholesalers.71 
Thus, once a new, small brewer makes a deal with a large, established 
wholesaler—which is necessary in the many states that do not allow direct sales 
or self-distribution—the contract is almost impossible to escape, and the 
wholesaler retains the power to be the sole seller of a brand in its territory.72 
In response to the failure of Prohibition, the government switched from 
full-scale abolition to relatively tight state or private control. What is most 
important is what was left out: beer. Notably, in both of Fosdick and Scott’s 
systems, beer remained separate; it could be sold at nonstate stores without direct 
government oversight.73 Beer was considered the more temperate alternative to 
strong wine or liquor and was encouraged as a substitute beverage.74 For this 
reason, Fosdick and Scott theorized that beer should be widely available, licensing 
should be liberal, and beer should be available to drink both on-premises, with or 
without food, and off-premises.75 While alcohol was generally subject to strict 
control, beer remained an exception. 
 
68 See, e.g., Brewery Sales and Sampling Laws, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.
org/government-affairs/laws/brewery-sales-and-sampling-laws [http://perma.cc/NB4F-9BVX] (gathering 
state law on direct brewery-to-customer sales). 
69 Marc E. Sorini, Beer Franchise Law Summary, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Beer-Franchise-Law-Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/9Y8G-EL2Q]. 
70 See id.; White, supra note 64 (explaining that America’s “two largest wholesalers—Southern 
Wine & Spirits and Republic National Distributing Company—have revenues of about $13 billion”); 
see also Koch, supra note 16 (showing that fewer than 3000 wholesalers remain and that “in most local 
markets over 90 percent of the beer is controlled by distributors . . . one of which is dependent on 
AB InBev for most of its volume, and the other on Miller Coors”); cf. Lawson, supra note 60, at 36-
37 (detailing how wine and liquor wholesalers have greatly consolidated and showing that the top 
twenty wholesalers control 67.9% of the entire American market). 
71 Sorini, supra note 69. 
72 See GROSSMAN, supra note 24, at 105 (discussing Sierra Nevada’s inability to cancel distributor 
contracts made in the 1980s, which have become detrimental to its business today); Scott, supra note 
26, at 432-35 (arguing that the effects of franchise laws and wholesaler territory monopolies are higher 
prices and decreased consumer choice). 
73 See supra notes 54–55. 
74 The name of the study may implicitly give this away: Toward Liquor Control, not Toward Alcohol 
Control or Toward Beer Control. See, e.g., FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 47, at 21 (determining that there 
should not be restrictions on sales of beer of 3.2% alcohol by volume (ABV) or less since it was not 
intoxicating). 
75 See id. 
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B. The Rise of Craft Beer 
Craft beer is the industry that never should have been.76 Somehow, a small 
group of innovators beat the odds and created sustainable businesses in the 
face of Big Beer’s stifling dominance. The craft beer movement, according to 
its most recent historian, Tom Acitelli, can be traced to Fritz Maytag and 
Anchor Brewing in the mid-1960s.77 The movement is currently in its so-called 
fourth wave.78 Instead of lingering long on craft beer’s history,79 this 
Comment will focus on the legal-regime changes that most directly contributed 
to the growth of the craft beer movement. 
Changing law was key to the growth of the craft beer industry.80 Changes 
in two legal regimes, one at the federal level and one at the state level, were 
most responsible for the rise of the craft beer industry.81 
First, on October 14, 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed into law a new 
provision in the tax code that legalized the home production of beer and 
wine.82 Up to a specified gallon amount, aspiring craft brewers could ply their 
trade at home for personal consumption.83 While multiple sources show that 
Americans were experimenting with home brew before legalization because 
of government non-enforcement,84 the legalization of homebrewing conceivably 
 
76 See ACITELLI, supra note 15, at 77-78 (“[W]e can almost step back and see the American craft 
beer movement as a doomed venture by 1979 and 1980, one that was by no means assured of 
stumbling out of the decade of stagflation and oil crises . . . .”). 
77 See id. at 9-11. 
78 See id. at 86-104 (detailing the first wave as Anchor, the second wave as New Albion and 
Sierra Nevada, the third wave as contract brewers and better-financed crafts, and the fourth wave as 
the current generation). 
79 For a full recitation, see generally id. 
80 Even now, it is more important for the craft brewer to be a lobbyist than to be a lawyer. See 
Welch, supra note 26, at 214 (“[F]or those of you who do not want to sacrifice your finances at the 
altar of good beer, you may find better odds with a lobbyist than with a lawyer.”). 
81 See James Fallows, Jimmy Carter: Not the King of Beers? (Updated), ATLANTIC (Aug. 19, 2010), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/08/jimmy-carter-not-the-king-of-beers-updated/61599 
[https://perma.cc/N4RQ-KB4M] (debating whether President Jimmy Carter’s legalization of homebrewing 
or California, Oregon, and Washington’s legalization of brewpubs should get more credit for the craft 
brew revolution). Ken Grossman of Sierra Nevada offers a different perspective. He believes that the 
three-tier system was essential to craft beer’s growth in America because it facilitated entrance by smaller 
breweries. See GROSSMAN, supra note 24, at 94-95 (comparing United States regulations to those in the 
United Kingdom, where brewers may own 2000 pubs, thus restricting competition). Grossman’s theory 
is that the separation of the wholesale and retail channels from Big Beer control allowed smaller brewers 
to compete equally for distribution and shelf space. See id. at 94-96 (noting that “the vertical integration 
of manufacturer and retailer . . . has generally stymied the growth of small and independent breweries”). 
82 Pub. L. No. 95-458, § 2(b), 92 Stat. 1255, 1255-56 (1986) (codified at I.R.C. § 5053(e) (2012)). 
83 See I.R.C. § 5053(e) (exempting beer produced for home use from taxation if it does not 
exceed 200 gallons per year and if there are two or more adults in the household). 
84 See GROSSMAN, supra note 24, at 19-21 (stating that Grossman began homebrewing in 1969 
and purchased materials from a homebrew shop); see also ACITELLI, supra note 15, at 57-58 (“The 
federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms essentially adopted a hear-no-evil, see-no-evil approach 
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had three substantial effects on the craft movement. Primarily, this legislative 
change legitimized and legalized covert homebrewers’ activities.85 Secondarily, 
it opened up a substantive dialogue between homebrewers and professionals, 
which eased the transition between avid homebrewers and professional 
brewer.86 Finally, it helped grow homebrew shops and their suppliers.87 
Newer, better, and bigger homebrew supply shops brought amateur brewers 
one step closer to professional brewing, especially when amateurs could buy 
professional-grade ingredients and equipment. One blogger theorizes that this 
act of “deregulation” allowed the craft brew movement to accelerate, noting 
that “90% of craft beers began as home brews.”88 Although this theory contains 
a kernel of truth, more significant changes were at work at the state level. 
Second, and more importantly, various states legalized brewpubs. In 1982, 
both California and Washington legalized the brewpub, with Oregon following 
suit in 1983.89 The first brewpub was built in Yakima, Washington by a Big Beer 
veteran who had always dreamed of having his own brewery—in a repurposed 
opera house.90 Data indicates that the real acceleration in craft brewing did 
not occur in the year after the legalization of homebrewing but in 1983 on the 
West Coast.91 Further proof rests in the fact that about two-thirds of all craft 
breweries in existence began as, or continue to be, brewpubs.92 Currently, the 
states with the most craft breweries (in absolute number) are California, Oregon, 
Colorado, and Washington—three of these states are the familiar first adopters 
of legal brewpubs.93 This is not a coincidence but a direct consequence of the 
change in law. With these federal and state laws, craft beer was primed for its 
modern explosion in popularity and our examination here. 
 
to enforcement, and there is no record of any American, including those who ran homebrewing shops, 
being arrested for homebrewing when it was illegal.”). 
85 See supra note 84. 
86 See ACITELLI, supra note 15, at 80 (discussing how the legitimization of homebrewing created 
an open dialogue between homebrewers and professionals). 
87 See id. (arguing that the legitimization of homebrewing meant that the homebrew shop could 
access better ingredients with less risk). 
88 See Fallows, supra note 81. But see ACITELLI, supra note 15, at 84 (“President Carter’s signature 
. . . did little beyond freeing homebrewing suppliers from fear of a federal raid and allow[ed] enthusiasts 
to congregate more openly.”). 
89 See Fallows, supra note 81. 
90 See ACITELLI, supra note 15, at 84-85 (explaining the creation of “Grant’s Pub,” the first 
post-Prohibition brewpub in America). 
91 See Fallows, supra note 81. 
92 See id. Currently, brewpubs represent about 40% of all craft brewers in America. Number of 
Breweries, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/number-of-breweries [https://
perma.cc/CH2W-5CNS] (showing that in 2015, there were 1730 brewpubs out of a total 4504 craft breweries). 
93 State Craft Beer Sales & Production Statistics, 2015, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewers
association.org/statistics/by-state [https://perma.cc/A6XS-PVH6]. California, Washington, and Oregon 
have 518, 305, and 228 craft breweries, respectively. The only other states that eclipse 200 are Colorado, New 
York, and Michigan with 284, 208, and 205 craft breweries, respectively. Id. 
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C. What Is Craft Beer? 
Craft beer is important, but what is it? Answering this question first 
requires a definition of who makes craft beer. “Craft brewery” is an umbrella 
term that encapsulates the entire industry. According to the brewers—through 
their lobbying body, the Brewers Association—a craft brewery is a brewery 
that (1) produces six million barrels or fewer annually; (2) is less than 25% 
owned or controlled by another “alcohol industry member” that is not also a 
craft brewery; and (3) brews most of its alcohol volume from traditional or 
innovative brewing ingredients.94 Craft breweries can be broken down into 
microbreweries, brewpubs, and regional breweries. A microbrewer is a very 
small brewery that produces less than 15,000 barrels per year and sells at least 
75% of that offsite.95 By contrast, a brewpub is a brewery that sells 25% or 
more of its beer onsite and brews “primarily for sale in [its] restaurant and 
bar.”96 Finally, a regional brewery is merely a larger microbrewery, fitting the 
same definition but selling more than 15,000 barrels per year.97 
Beyond these somewhat technical definitions are the aspirations that bind 
craft brewers together as a movement. Craft brewers are driven by innovation, 
usually based on traditional ingredients—like malted barley, hops, and 
spices—in novel ways.98 Craft brewers are relatively small in size, committed 
to quality, and devoted to methods and recipes steeped in centuries-old 
tradition.99 For example, both Yards and Dogfish Head have recreated beer 
from our nation’s founding and from ancient civilizations.100 Innovative craft 
 
94 Craft Brewer Defined, supra note 30; see also BOSTWICK, supra note 4, at 188 (explaining that 
the definition of craft beer was recently changed—raising the cut-0ff six million barrels from two 
million—to accommodate Boston Beer Co.). 
95 See Craft Beer Industry Market Segments, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/
statistics/market-segments [https://perma.cc/N4EQ-6BTW]; United States Breweries, BREWERS ASS’N, 
https://www.brewersassociation.org/directories/breweries/?type=micro&term=United%20States&searchby=
country [https://perma.cc/2K2G-GCFG] (select “Pennsylvania” as “State”; then filter by “Microbreweries”) 
(listing Pennsylvania microbreweries, such as Stoudts, Pizza Boy, and Philadelphia Brewing). 
96 See Craft Beer Industry Market Segments, supra note 95; United States Breweries, supra note 95 
(select “Pennsylvania” as “State” and filter by “Brewpub”) (providing examples of brewpubs in 
Pennsylvania, such as Appalachian, 2nd Story, and Tired Hands). 
97  See Craft Beer Industry Market Segments, supra note 95; United States Breweries, supra note 95 
(filter by “Regional”) (providing examples of regional breweries, such as Anchor, Boston Beer, Sierra 
Nevada, Rogue, and Shipyard). 
98 Craft Brewer Defined, supra note 30. 
99 See ACITELLI, supra note 15, at 103 (describing the craft beer industry as bound by a 
philosophy of “small, independent, and traditional” brewers). 
100 See Ales of the Revolution, YARDS BREWING COMPANY, http://yardsbrewing.com/ales-of-
revolution [https://perma.cc/8XUY-WMLB] (showcasing three Yards beers based on recipes used 
by Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, and Benjamin Franklin); Ancient Ales, DOGFISH HEAD, 
http://shop.dogfish.com/ancientales [https:/perma.cc/8M2A-MZ6W] (highlighting Dogfish Head’s 
work with Dr. Patrick McGovern to recreate nine ancient beers based on old recipes and molecular 
evidence from international historical sites). 
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brewers have also created new favorites, such as the IPA and pumpkin ale, by 
adding a twist to old recipes.101 
II. ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO ENTRY: LOWERING  
TAXES ON SMALL BREWERS 
A. The History and Policy of Beer Taxation 
“The history of the American brewing industry is a history of a battle 
between control and individual freedom. The federal government sought to 
control the industry by taxation while brewers sought the freedom to pursue 
their economic livelihood.”102 Taxing alcohol has been a governmental mainstay. 
Almost every ancient civilization has taxed alcohol.103 America’s own income 
tax, the collective bane of most Americans’ Aprils, is a rather recent addition 
when compared to the taxation of alcohol.104 After independence and the 
adoption of the Constitution, the next order of business for Alexander 
Hamilton and George Washington was to institute a federal tax on whiskey 
to pay off government debts.105 That first effort at taxation ended in the 1793 
Whiskey Rebellion without much money collected.106 Notably absent was any 
excise tax on the other domestic alcohol, beer, because Hamilton thought the 
tax was unnecessary to preserve good health and could be harmful to the 
fledgling brewing industry.107 
While the alcohol tax has endured, its purpose has changed. The income tax 
contributed to the erosion of brewers’ once-unassailable nineteenth-century 
standing as a primary federal government revenue-producer108 and signaled a shift 
in purpose of alcohol taxation from revenue creation to consumption control.109 
The purpose of taxation is now twofold: to correct negative externalities, a so-called 
 
101 See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
102 MITTELMAN, supra note 9, at 4. 
103 See Jurkiewicz & Painter, supra note 44, at 2 (“Alcohol regulation arose in historical times 
as societies became more cultured, and was first instituted in ancient Greece, Mesopotamia, Egypt, 
and Rome . . . .”). 
104 See Brief History of IRS, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/brief-history-of-irs [https://perma.cc/
QPH2-R9MH] (last updated Sept. 28, 2016) (stating that the first income tax was instituted during 
the Civil War, but that the current income tax was instituted only in 1913 with the passage of the 
Sixteenth Amendment). 
105 See MITTELMAN, supra note 9, at 15 (explaining that, as part of the deal for assuming state 
liabilities from the Revolutionary War, the federal government would exact an excise tax on distilled 
spirits, which came with The Excise Act of 1791). 
106 See id. at 15-16. 
107 Id. at 15. 
108 See id. at 81-83 (showing how the rise of the income tax in funding the federal government 
diminished the brewers’ lobbying powers and eventually led to Prohibition). 
109 See FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 47, at 69 (“The fundamental objective [of alcohol taxation] 
should be not revenue but rational and effective social control.”). 
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Pigovian tax, and to discourage consumption, a byproduct of Prohibition-era 
attitudes.110 The problem for craft beer is that this dual purpose does not apply 
as strongly to its industry as it does to other alcohol producers. 
B. Current State of the Law 
Instead of dealing with the enormous number of state and local taxes, this 
Comment will focus on commonsense suggestions for the federal system. 
Focusing on the federal system only requires convincing one legislative body 
instead of fifty. Furthermore, evidence suggests that most of the tax revenues 
and funding for government programs addressing alcohol stem from the 
federal government, not the states.111 In other words, the federal system is 
where the liability rests and the assets exist. 
Currently, federal law distinguishes excise tax rates based on the amount 
of barrels brewed per year. For those who produce more than 2 million 
barrels112 per year, the tax rate is $18 per barrel.113 For those brewers producing 
up to 2 million barrels per year, the tax rate is $7 per barrel up to 60,000 
barrels.114 After 60,000 barrels, the rate returns to $18 per barrel.115 Thus, the 
federal government recognizes three sizes of brewers: 60,000 barrels and 
below, 2 million barrels and below, and over 2 million barrels. 
Beyond the actual taxes are the compliance costs attached to calculating and 
paying the myriad of federal, state, and local taxes.116 This could affect where 
a brewer wishes to locate his brewery. Moreover, these compliance costs are 
dizzying.117 The danger of these costs creating an “anticommons” in the alcohol 
industry has been understood since immediately after Prohibition.118 Compliance 
 
110 Schwalm, supra note 33, at 24. But see MITTELMAN, supra note 9, at 182 (elucidating that the 
neo-temperance movement of the 1980s and 1990s was interested in offsetting tax losses with more 
revenue from “sin taxes”). 
111 See Rhodes, supra note 61, at 83 (noting that “alcohol prevention programs accounted for only 
4 percent . . . of policy activity in the states during the last thirty years of the twentieth century”). 
112 Whenever the term “barrel” is used in this part of the tax code, it refers to a standard size 
of thirty-one gallons. See 27 C.F.R. § 25.151 (2016) (laying out the tax rate for barrels containing not 
more than thirty-one gallons). 
113 Id.; see also MITTELMAN, supra note 9, at 183 (calculating that the 1991 change in excise tax 
doubled from $9 to $18 a barrel, coming out to about 32¢ per six-pack). 
114 See 27 C.F.R. § 25.152. 
115 Id. 
116 See FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 47, at 72 (“Upon the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, 
federal, state, and many local governments will doubtless proceed to impose all kinds of manufacturers’ 
and retail taxes and licenses upon the liquor business. The rush to pass new tax laws is already underway.”). 
117 See, e.g., MITCHELL & KOOPMAN, supra note 3167, at 3 (“[S]tarting a microbrewery in the 
state of Virginia requires as many procedures as starting a small business in China or Venezuela, 
countries notorious for their excessive barriers to entry.”). 
118 See id. at 3-4 (comparing this type of taxation on the beer industry to the “robber barons” 
of the Rhine river in the Middle Ages); see also FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 47, at 72 (finding 
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costs benefit established competitors and disproportionately burden new, 
smaller players.119 While compliance costs will not be considered in any further 
detail here, these costs must factor into any policymaker’s assessment of the 
fairness and effectiveness of the alcohol taxation scheme.120 
C. The Problems with the Current System of Taxation 
Taxing craft beer does little to serve the dual purposes of the current tax 
scheme: correcting negative externalities and discouraging consumption. It is 
difficult to justify taxation that is not fulfilling its purpose, especially when it 
stifles industry and limits the availability of domestic jobs. In short, the 
taxation problem is two-fold as it relates to craft beer: the tax rate is too high 
for its stated purposes and the distinctions between brewery production levels 
do not match the current state of the craft brew industry. 
First, the taxation barely serves its Pigovian purpose. Pigovian taxes make 
users pay the government to correct the externalities created by their consumption. 
Alcohol undoubtedly has deleterious social effects, such as drunk driving, cirrhosis, 
and broken families,121 but it is unfair to assume that craft beer is equally to 
blame. Big Beer, not craft brewers, depend upon pushing consumption to 
realize efficiencies of scale.122 Rather, craft brewers focus on creating quality, 
super-premium beer meant to be savored.123 But, it is being taxed as if it were 
built upon the same model as Big Beer: a single, unoffending offering to 
 
that the “inconsistent mass of conflicting and overlapping tax legislation . . . [with] wasteful 
duplication and conflicting policies in administration may render inefficient and ineffective the 
whole tax structure”). 
119 See MITCHELL & KOOPMAN, supra note 31, at 4 (“Even though many of the regulations 
surveyed above (licensing, permitting, prior agency approval for formulas, etc.) raise costs on all 
firms regardless of their size, the costs of compliance tend to be particularly burdensome for newer 
and smaller operators. That means many large, established firms benefit from these rules since they 
raise their rivals’ costs.” (footnote omitted)). 
120 Compliance costs, even though they effectively change the level of taxation from the brewer’s 
perspective, will not be addressed in this Comment. But, the federal government has considered it in a 
limited capacity. A majority of Senators support the Brewers Association’s suggestion to reduce 
biweekly tax filings to the federal government for 90% of brewers based on their size. Press Release, 
Brewers Ass’n, Majority of U.S. Senators Support Beer Tax Reform (Sept. 26, 2016), https://
brewersassociation.org/press_relreases/majority-U-S-Senators-Support-beer-tax-reform [https://perma.
cc/8NLH-WJRR]. 
121 See Schwalm, supra note 33, at 25-27 (canvassing current studies on the economic impact of 
alcohol on mortality, medical expenses, productivity, and crime). 
122 See ACITELLI, supra note 15, at 25-26 (showing that the Big Beer business model was built 
on profit margins created from economies of scale). 
123 For example, Matthew Reich, former owner of New Amsterdam, said that craft beer is “not 
for the six-pack drinker. It’s the beer to have if you’re having one. With dinner.” Id. at 121. Some of 
these beer styles, like those based on Belgian recipes, are technically a meal replacement. See 
BOSTWICK, supra note 4, at 54 (discussing the basis of the Belgian-abbey-style ales and their purpose 
as “[b]rewed for sustenance”). 
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please the masses.124 The Pigovian head of the taxation scheme only weakly 
supports taxing craft beer.125 
The second aim of taxing beer is to artificially inflate prices to limit 
consumption. Studies have shown that a higher total price is one of the most 
effective ways to curb alcohol consumption.126 As super-premium beer that is sold 
at steep prices, craft beer—by its very nature—discourages consumption, without 
the need for added taxation.127 The thirty-two cents imposed on a six-pack of craft 
beer does little to change consumer choice at the margins for craft beer drinkers. 
Furthermore, studies show that beer is the least price sensitive form of alcohol.128 
Taxes at the margins are less effective in changing consumer behavior when it 
comes to beer. Finally, the craft beer business model does not rest on efficiencies 
of scale, so the price likely will never significantly decrease based on pure market 
factors.129 Thus, taxes are serving a diluted purpose when it comes to a $12 to $15 
six-pack of craft beer or an $18 750 milliliter bottle. 
The only purpose left standing is government revenue creation. Revenue 
creation through alcohol taxation is not supported by policy or many Americans. 
Modern alcohol policy does not rest on a rationale of pure revenue creation.130 
Revenue creation is merely a byproduct of the other purposes of taxation. 
Moreover, taxing beer is highly regressive and affects the poorest consumers and 
the poorest producers most dramatically.131 Thus, regressive taxation has always 
been—at least—a politically unwise choice. Even with a substance as polarizing 
 
124 See id. at 230-31 (quoting a 1951 article in Modern Brewery Age, which found that Americans 
wanted “an agreeable, mild hop flavor and no bitter aftertaste”). 
125 In any event, it is also unclear whether the Pigovian purpose of these taxes could ever truly be 
realized. Not only is it difficult to compute accurately the cumulative negative social effects of alcohol, 
but it is also even more challenging to calculate alcohol’s positive impacts. 
126 See Jurkiewicz & Painter, supra note 44, at 9 (detailing how minimum markup laws help to 
ensure that the price of alcohol does not make it more accessible); Rhodes, supra note 61, at 87 (stating 
that one way, empirically, to limit consumption is through raising the total price). 
127 Although price controls by states have been deemed unconstitutional by Healy v. Beer 
Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 324 (1989), market-imposed prices surely are not. 
128 See Schwalm, supra note 33, at 21 (calculating the price sensitivity of beer at -0.35, whereas 
wine price sensitivity is -0.68 and liquor price sensitivity is -0.98). 
129 See German Estevez Rutishauser et al., A Perfect Storm Brewing in the Global Beer Business, 
MCKINSEY & COMPANY (June 2015), http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/marketing-and-
sales/our-insights/a-perfect-storm-brewing-in-the-global-beer-business [https://perma.cc/VZ8Z-R83Q] 
(stating that “economies of scale are less important in the” super-premium segment, which includes 
all craft beer). Regardless, craft brewers do not have enough production to benefit from economies 
of scale in the same way as Big Beer. For example, in 2014, the entire craft industry was smaller than 
the Bud Light brand. Jason Notte, Goodbye, Bud Light and Miller Lite, Here Come Session IPAs, 
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 27, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/goodbye-bud-light-
and-miller-lite-here-come-session-ipas-2015-03-27 [https://perma.cc/VM2L-F8PW]. 
130 See Rhodes, supra note 61, at 85 (arguing that taxation has never been the main form of 
alcohol control though it has become “frequent and widely accepted”). 
131 See Jurkiewicz & Painter, supra note 44, at 13 (“[S]uch taxes are regressive forms of taxation 
that unduly target the middle class and blue collar workers . . . .”). 
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as alcohol, most Americans do not support an increase in taxation as a means of 
control, much less for mere revenue.132 Taxation as a means of control may be 
palatable, even if it is one of the least effective means.133 However, if it is only 
being used as a means for revenue creation, approval for taxation dissipates. 
There are additional problems in how the government has chosen to distinguish 
between producers. Although distinguishing between sizes is admirable, current 
distinctions do not match the market. By number, the largest single segment of 
the craft beer industry is the microbrewery—breweries that produce less than 
15,000 barrels of beer a year.134 Microbrewers, however, only account for 16% of 
the total volume of beer produced in the craft market, trailing well behind the 
much bigger regional brewery segment of the market, which captures upward 
of 70%.135 If the current distinctions are intended to grant a tax break to the 
smallest brewers, the barrelage line between microbrewers and regional brewers 
has been misjudged. 
D. A Proposed Solution and Its Effects 
Despite the current tax challenges, there is light on the horizon. Still 
before Congress is the Craft Beverage Modernization and Tax Reform Act of 
2017.136 The bill proposes that the excise tax should be reduced to $3.50 per 
barrel, instead of $7, for the first 60,000 barrels for any brewer under 2 million 
barrels annually.137 It also proposes a cut of $2, down to $16, for all brewers 
under 6 million barrels annually.138 For any brewer of over 6 million barrels 
annually—only the few biggest brewers at the top—the rate would remain at 
 
132 See Rhodes, supra note 61, at 90 (finding that, based on poll data, only 43% of Americans 
support an increase in alcohol taxation as a means of alcohol control). 
133 In theory, raising taxes should increase total price. But reality tells a different story. The real 
price of alcohol has actually declined, so taxes are not effectively raising total price. See id. at 85 (“The 
actual price of alcohol has declined since 1970 in relation to cost of living and cost of non-alcoholic 
beverages.”); see also Jurkiewicz & Painter, supra note 44, at 13 (“[A] recent study succinctly pointed out 
that raising alcohol taxes is not as effective as having a wide variety of active and enforced alcohol 
regulations . . . .”). 
134 This does not include brewpubs that produce less than 15,000 barrels a year. See Number of 
Breweries, supra note 92 (calculating that, as of 2015, there were 2596 microbreweries in America, 
which accounted for approximately 58% of the total market); see also Federal Excise Tax, BEER INST., 
http://www.beerinstitute.org/policy-issues/excise-tax [https://perma.cc/ME6X-HED6] (“More than 90 
percent of all federally-permitted brewers produce fewer than 7,143 barrels annually . . . .”). 
135 See National Beer Sales & Production Data 2015, supra note 36 (click on “Production” tab) 
(showing that regional brewers account for approximately 78% of craft beer production, that 
microbrewers account for 16%, and that brewpub and contract brewers account for approximately 6%). 
136 Craft Beverage Modernization and Tax Reform Act of 2017, S. 236, 115th Cong. (2017); 
Craft Beverage Modernization and Tax Reform Act of 2017, H.R. 747, 115th Cong. (2017). 
137 S. 236 § 201(b)(1)–(2). 
138 Id. § 201(a)(1)(A)(i). 
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$18 per barrel.139 This is an encouraging starting point, but it still suffers from 
a lack of fine calibration. 
Before proposing how to more finely tune this bill, it is helpful to examine 
its benefits. The bill still creates big savings for small brewers. For brewers 
making less than 60,000 barrels, they stand to save as much as $210,000 
annually in taxes.140 The biggest brewers—assuming production of exactly 6 
million barrels a year—stand to save about $12 million annually. Clearly, these 
savings could be used for significant investment and growth. Further, given 
that craft beer only accounts for 12.2% of the beer industry by volume, only a 
modest amount of revenue will be diverted from the Treasury.141 
To truly encourage craft beer growth and innovative recipes, the bill should be 
amended to make distinctions that more accurately reflect the market. A better 
scheme would distinguish between brewers who produce up to 15,000 barrels, 
60,000 barrels, and 6 million barrels. Microbrewers—those who brew less than 
15,000 barrels annually—should be granted the greatest tax reductions. As 
production increases, the system may gradually impose higher taxes as the brewery 
grows throughout its lifecycle.142 At that point, taxes per barrel could revert to the 
current rates. 
This alternative scheme can do the most good at the least cost while easing 
brewers into higher taxes as they grow. Microbrewers are the smallest and most 
vulnerable members of the industry. For microbrewers, unlike Big Beer, taxation 
is a high barrier to entry. Although microbrewers are the largest craft brewer 
group, by absolute number, they account for only a small portion of the industry 
by volume.143 Reduced taxes specifically targeting microbrewers will be felt by the 
most breweries with the least effect on government revenue. Finally, a progressive 
system is needed to gradually acclimatize small brewers to increasingly onerous 
tax burdens. Because brewers pay taxes upon sale, taxes come out of their 
wholesale price to distributors. Gradually increasing taxes incentivizes craft 
brewers to build their business beyond 15,000 barrels because they will have less 
reason to fear that taxation will seriously lower their bottom lines. 
 
139 Id. § 201(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
140 A quick calculation bears this out. These brewers would save $3.50 per barrel on 60,000 
barrels, equaling $210,000 saved on taxes. 
141 See National Beer Sales & Production Data 2015, supra note 36 (documenting that 24,076,864 
barrels of craft beer were sold in 2015). While hundreds of millions of dollars in lost revenue might 
seem significant, it pales in comparison to the $3.2 trillion that the federal government collected in 
2015. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Historical Tables, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/budget/Historicals [https://perma.cc/GEB7-WHH3] (click 
on “Table 1.1—Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-): 1789–2021”). 
142 As the craft beer industry fully matures, more amendments may be needed to match 
brewery models. 
143 While microbrewers account for only 16% of craft beer by volume, they comprise 58% of craft 
breweries. See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
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There is abundant anecdotal evidence that tax breaks ease the burden for 
startup craft brewers. For instance, a tax break early in the craft beer movement 
was instrumental in jumpstarting that movement.144 Significant tax savings not 
only makes the industry more attractive to would-be brewers and their 
financial backers but also helps brewers build steady, sustainable growth.145 
That money could be used to upgrade equipment, hire new talent, or even 
finance leasehold improvements. 
According to Ken Grossman, every little bit of money can count in the 
brewing business.146 His early forays into starting his own business were built 
on pushing the boundaries of his aging, cramped equipment and facilities.147 
He wasted much time and money repairing or reworking equipment.148 
Because of his careful business planning and luck, he was able to survive, but 
other startups likely will not be so lucky.149 Lowering taxes for the smallest 
brewers benefits the industry by lowering a barrier to entry and creating more 
competition. Competition begets innovation. Most importantly, tax breaks will 
neither disservice the purposes of taxation nor thwart the federal government 
out of an excessive amount of revenue. But this is only one part of the recipe 
for innovation. 
III. CREATING A HEALTHY PROFIT: GUARANTEEING  
SUCCESS FOR BREWPUBS 
A. The Central Importance of the Brewpub 
Brewpubs are the lynchpin of the craft beer movement.150 During the 
formative 1990s, brewpubs—not microbreweries—were the dominant form of 
 
144 See ACITELLI, supra note 15, at 63 (citing a federal tax break from nine to seven dollars per 
barrel “on the first sixty thousand barrels” for brewers with no more than “two million barrels 
annually” as a “godsend” to the initial growth of craft brewers). 
145 See, e.g., Craft Beverage Modernization & Tax Reform Act (S. 1562, H.R. 2903) Infographic, 
BEER INST., http://www.beerinstitute.org/policy-issues/craft-beverage-modernization-tax-reform-
act [https://perma.cc/H26S-79RM] (arguing that lower taxes will, in addition to growing the industry, 
have downstream effects on job growth throughout beer, agriculture, and business). 
146 See GROSSMAN, supra note 24, at 99-101. 
147 See id. (sharing Grossman’s experiences buying old dairy equipment, a soda bottling line, and 
making his own grain grinder—all of which periodically broke down, causing intense anxiety and a lot 
of lost time). 
148 See id. 
149 See id. at 45-60 (discussing Grossman’s reliance on family and friends for funding and the 
fact that banks refused to fund his venture because regional breweries were dying and craft beer was 
not yet popular). 
150 See supra text accompanying notes 89–93 (explaining the elemental importance of the 
brewpub to the creation of the craft beer phenomenon). 
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craft brewing in America.151 Bill Owens, Bert Grant, and Ken Grossman are 
among the “legendary pioneers” of the craft beer movement that first 
popularized the brewpub form in post-Prohibition America.152 Finally, by 2012, 
microbreweries caught up with brewpubs.153 Now, brewpubs are second to 
microbrewers in both number and overall production, but brewpubs still account 
for approximately 37% of the craft breweries in operation.154 Brewpubs are still 
an important part of the market as well as a viable, much needed form of business. 
There are many reasons why this style of brewing up a business has been popular. 
First, brewpubs provide a source of revenue that is not so intricately tied 
to the success of a new beer. A startup that has more than one way to make 
money is less risky. In fact, statistics show that brewpubs have a higher rate 
of success than restaurants. While about 60% of restaurants close within their 
first three years, only 46% of brewpubs close within their first three years.155 
The brewpub is a safer way to open a brewery and spread risk. 
Second, brewpubs allow the brewer to constantly, albeit informally, survey 
reactions to different recipes for new brews. The ability to keg a small batch 
of beer, bring it to the bar, and ask for customer reactions on the spot is 
invaluable to understanding the market.156 Unlike Big Beer, most small 
breweries neither have the resources nor the knowledge to perform formal 
surveys on their new products. Therefore, the brewpub remains one of the 
only options for a small brewer to test recipes on the market and prove its 
worth to distributors and retailers.157  
 
151 See ACITELLI, supra note 15, at 198 (“[M]ore than 360 [brewpubs] were in operation by the 
spring of 1995, besting the number of craft breweries by more than three to two.”). 
152 Id. at 198. 
153 Number of Breweries, supra note 92. 
154 National Beer Sales & Production Data 2015, supra note 36 (click on “Production” tab); 
Number of Breweries, supra note 92. 
155 Bart Watson, The Brewpub Advantage, BREWERS ASS’N (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www. brewers
association.org/articles/the-brewpub-advantage [https://perma.cc/W6WX-QYBP]. 
156 See Dogfish Head Brewing & Eats, DOGFISH HEAD CRAFT BREWED ALES, http://www.
dogfish.com/eats/brewpub/index.htm [https://perma.cc/47XE-GLXK] (“Because the batches were 
small, Sam [Calagione, the founder of Dogfish Head,] could afford to indulge his off-centered 
whims. He’d wander into the brewpub’s kitchen and grab a handful of raisins, a cup of maple syrup 
or a scoop of roasted chicory.”); cf. Cyrena Nouzille, Six Tactics for Keeping Your Brewpub Relevant in 
a Changing Environment, Brewers Ass’n (May 31, 2016), https://www.brewersassociation.org/articles/
six-tactics-keeping-brewpub-relevant-changing-environment [https://perma.cc/29A3-NT6Q] (“Daily, 
direct access to the consumer allows a brewpub to stay in tune with how its brand is perceived.”). 
157 Of course, brewers may also bring samples to retailers to allow them to try the beer 
themselves. However, many states severely restrict the size of the samples through tied-house laws. 
For example, the District of Columbia requires an additional permit to give out a 12-ounce sample. 
Brewery Sales and Sampling Laws, supra note 68 (click on “Choose a State”; then select “District of 
Columbia”). Idaho only allows a 1.5 ounce sample in a designated tasting area. Id. (click on “Choose 
a State”; then select “Idaho”). And Illinois only allows three samples, up to two ounces each, per 
person, per day. Id. (click on “Choose a State”; then select “Illinois”). In essence, these laws prohibit 
a brewer from giving a bar a free keg to see how the beer sells for a week. Thus, one of the brewpub’s 
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Third, brewpubs are an effective way to informally market beer. If a 
brewpub has good food, people may come for the food but stay for the beer. 
Once customers enter the brewpub, they become a captive audience. Brewpubs 
also create a low-stakes environment for testing a new brewery’s offerings. 
Instead of investing in a six-pack of beer, customers can order a tasting paddle 
or try a few small samples of the beer to find one that suits their taste. This 
sample may not only persuade customers to buy a full glass158 but also introduce 
reluctant consumers to beers they may never otherwise try on their own 
initiative.159 Allowing direct interaction between the brewer and its customers 
is essential to creating growth through a word-of-mouth following. 
Fourth, because brewpubs allow producers to sell directly to the customer, they 
retain more profits. Bill Owens, the owner of Buffalo Bill’s, chose the brewpub 
model for just this reason. As he stated, “For $130 worth of ingredients, I can 
make a $2,500 profit . . . . A glass of lager . . . costs seven cents. I sell it for a 
dollar and a half. Compare my profit on a bottle of commercial beer—forty 
cents.”160 From Bill’s calculations, the profits under the brewpub model are over 
three times larger than profits from selling to consumers through retailers. Such 
profits are a boon for small brewers who may be barely surviving from one batch 
to the next. But these profits are also why some wholesalers are so dead set against 
the expansion of the brewpub model: the brewers receive the wholesalers’ cut.161 
Fifth, in states that allow a brewpub to make off-premises sales, brewpubs 
can also be retail outlets for beer. In many ways, it is difficult for a small 
brewer to persuade a distributor to carry its brand and even more difficult for 
that distributor to persuade retailers to do the same.162 This problem is somewhat 
 
only ways to prove success to a retailer is through its own brewpub sales. For a full list of state laws 
on sampling, see id. 
158 See Tim Brady, The Value of Fractional Pours, BREWERS ASS’N (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.
brewersassociation.org/articles/the-value-of-fractional-pours [https://perma.cc/U5HL-8PJQ] (making 
the case for allowing free or reduced price samples because, according to Tim Brady's informal 
experiment at the Whetstone Station Restaurant, Brewery & Bier Garten, 71% of customers go on 
to buy the beer). 
159 See id. (showing that the average number of beer brands on a check rose from two to four 
after a brewpub implemented four-ounce pours on every draft beer available). 
160 ACITELLI, supra note 15, at 98. 
161 See White, supra note 64 (“The wholesaling industry’s survival depends on maintaining 
today’s highly regulated system.”). 
162 See, e.g., GROSSMAN, supra note 24, at 92, 102-03 (describing the need to self-distribute in 
Sierra Nevada’s early days and the difficulties in finding a distributor to sell its beer to retailers); Georgia 
Brewers and Wholesalers Agree on Bill to Allow Direct Sales, GOOD BEER HUNTING: SIGHTLINES (Jan. 
26, 2017), http://goodbeerhunting.com/sightlines/2017/1/26/georgia-brewers-and-wholesalers-agree-
on-bill-to-allow-direct-sales [https://perma.cc/KF5L-P6N2] (quoting Bob Sandage, owner of Wrecking 
Bar Brewpub, as saying that limited direct on- and off-premises sales would allow “the small 
breweries to make revenue that would allow them to grow faster and easier”); see also MS Breweries 
One Step Closer to Direct Beer Sales, WLOX, http://www.wlox.com/story/34671001/ms-breweries-one-
step-closer-to-direct-beer-sales [https://perma.cc/N6XP-56L5] (last updated Mar. 5, 2017, 11:47 PM) (quoting 
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alleviated if craft brewers sell the beer for off-premises consumption—whether 
in cans, bottles, or growlers.163 For these five reasons, the brewpub makes a 
strong argument against the current state of the law. 
Finally, brewpubs are not merely meant to be standalone businesses. Many 
brewers do not dream of just owning a brewpub. Brewpubs are a launching pad 
for a brewer and his or her brands. A brewpub is a calculated investment by a 
brewer for growth. States have not taken this into account, and, as a result, they 
have created laws that fail to support the structure necessary for brewpub success. 
B. The Current Law 
As mentioned previously, all states follow a system that—in its structure—does 
not allow a producer to simultaneously be a retailer.164 But since the brewpub exists, 
this cannot always be the case. Almost all states allow brewpubs in some form,165 
and only two states have no brewpub license.166 Even though brewpubs are 
generally allowed, the brewpub is viewed as a limited, and jealously guarded, 
exception to the tied-house rule and the three-tiered system—explaining 
some of the more confusing restrictions imposed on brewpubs that are not 
imposed on normal breweries.167 
 
David Reese, brewmaster at Chandeleur Island Brewing Company, as saying that on- and off-
premises sales would help them “grow,” “create jobs,” and “create more revenue”). 
163 See David Schechter & WFAA, North Texas Craft Breweries Team Up in Legal Battle vs. State, 
WFAA8ABC (Sept. 18, 2015), http://legacy.wfaa.com/story/news/local/texas-news/2015/09/18/north-
texas-craft-breweries-team-up-legal-battle-vs-state/72429740 [https://perma.cc/4K6L-WYFJ] (citing one 
craft brewer as saying that his sales would increase by 50% if he was able to sell retail six-packs out 
of his brewery). 
164 See supra text accompanying note 59. 
165 The following states allow brewpubs, with limitations noted in parentheses: Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, 
Florida (but not permitted to sell offsite or distribute), Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland (2000-barrel limit), Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota (3500-barrel limit), Mississippi (no off-premises sales), Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada (taproom only), New Hampshire, New Jersey (no more than 10,000 barrels), New York (five 
separate locations per person, 5000-barrel limit per premise and 20,000-barrel limit total), North 
Carolina, North Dakota (10,000-barrel limit), Ohio, Oregon (may only self-distribute if under 5000-barrel 
limit, if over 200,000-barrel limit cannot sell liquor), Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina 
(2000-barrel limit), South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas (10,000-barrel limit), Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington (2400-barrel limit and no off-premise sales), West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. See 
Brewery Sales and Sampling Laws, supra note 68. 
166 Brewpubs in New Mexico may only get a restaurant license. Id. Oklahoma limits sales at a 
brewery to 3.2% or less ABV; all the rest must go through a wholesaler. Id. This means that a brewpub 
must sell its beer to a wholesaler, which must sell the beer back to the brewpub before the brewpub 
is able to sell the beer to the consumer. 
167 Cf. Richard Newman, Modified N.J. Rules Aid Craft Brewers, NORTHJERSEY.COM, http://
archive.northjersey.com/news/business/modified-n-j-rules-aid-craft-brewers-1.1289302 [https://perma.cc/
J3HE-LFSH] (last updated Mar. 15, 2015, 11:17 AM) (discussing changes in New Jersey laws regarding 
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There are five major problems with the restrictions that states have placed 
on the brewpub format. First, and most obviously, forbidding brewpubs is a 
serious problem. New Mexico’s and Oklahoma’s laws create uncertainty over the 
legality of the second-most popular form of craft breweries in the country.168 Not 
surprisingly, Oklahoma is second to last in the nation in breweries per capita.169 
Second, some states limit the brewpub permit to allow only the sale of beer or 
wine—but not hard liquor by the glass—making brewpubs less competitive 
with restaurants, which typically are permitted to sell liquor.170 Third, some 
states severely limit how much beer a brewpub may brew and serve per year.171 
Fourth, some states do not allow direct, off-premise sales to customers, either 
through growlers or six-packs from brewpubs.172 Fifth, and finally, some states 
allow growler sales but do not allow the same type of sale when poured from 
draft into a can of the same size.173 These restrictions on brewpubs limit the 
potential of craft beer and can be easily solved through commonsense solutions. 
C. Commonsense Solutions That Satisfy the Three-Tier System 
The first problem is whether to allow the brewpub format at all. As a basic 
matter, every state should allow brewers to sell beer directly to consumers 
when it is served in the brewer’s restaurant. Technically, this practice does 
not violate the policy behind the three-tier system. Fosdick and Scott 
acknowledged that the three-tier system was meant to address the excessive 
drinking of liquor in saloons, not the drinking of beer and wine with meals.174 
Furthermore, Fosdick and Scott distinguish between those alcohols that are 
 
direct brewery sales to consumers and stating that “[o]ne of the things you don’t touch in New Jersey 
is liquor laws”). 
168 See Number of Breweries, supra note 92. 
169 See State Craft Beer Sales & Production Statistics, 2015, supra note 93 (calculating that 
Oklahoma has 0.5 breweries per 100,000 adults with only fourteen breweries in the entire state). 
170 See, e.g., Brewery Sales and Sampling Laws, supra note 68 (click on “Choose a State” dropdown 
menu; select “Oregon”; then click on “Retail Provisions”) (noting that Oregon prohibits brewpubs 
from selling liquor). 
171 See, e.g., id. (click on “Choose a State” dropdown menu; select “Maryland” or “South 
Carolina”; then click on “Retail Provisions”) (noting that Maryland and South Carolina limit 
brewpubs to production of only 2000 barrels a year). 
172 See, e.g., id. (click on “Choose a State” dropdown menu; select “Florida”; then click on “Retail 
Provisions”) (noting that Florida does not allow retail sales for consumption offsite or to distributors). 
173 See Ronnie Crocker, State Seizes Bar’s Beer-Can Machine, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS 
(Oct. 4, 2015), http://www.expressnews.com/business/local/article/State-seizes-bar-s-beer-can-machine-
6549798.php [https://perma.cc/TY3D-2VAB] (detailing how the state of Texas seized a machine from 
a bar that makes “crowlers”—32-ounce aluminum cans filled with beer—since the canning process was too 
close to manufacturing canned beers and thus required the bar to obtain a manufacturing license to use the 
machine, even though the machine was merely an alternative to the accepted growler-pouring process). 
174 See FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 47, at 21-22 (advocating that wine and beer should not 
be strictly regulated when sold in a restaurant with a meal). 
2017] Brewing Better Law 1491 
naturally fermented, like beer and wine, and those that are distilled, like 
whiskey and bourbon.175 Their rationale was to encourage beer and wine 
consumption in place of distilled liquors, which were thought to be much 
more dangerous.176 For them, both beer and wine sales, for on- and off-premises 
consumption, were subject to a more liberal permit system, not the strict 
licensure system.177 This sort of alcohol consumption falls outside of the 
three-tier system as envisioned by Fosdick and Scott and adopted by the 
states. This technical exception does not threaten the three-tier system. All 
states should allow brewpubs. 
Second, if states allow the brewpub model, they should allow on-premises 
sales of wine and spirits, not just beer. If states limit the sale of other types 
of alcohol, they risk dooming the brewpub’s competitiveness and breaking one 
of the guiding principles of the three-tier system—the rule against tied 
houses. If a brewpub is not treated as a regular restaurant for liquor-licensing 
purposes, it loses its ability to compete effectively in the market.178 In Wisconsin, 
the state stripped the brewpub One Barrel Brewing of its liquor license, 
resulting in a 10% loss of its revenue stream.179 Not only are such actions unfair 
as compared to other restaurants—the restaurants that brewpubs compete with 
for consumers—but these actions also set brewpubs up for failure.180 Why 
should one restaurant be treated differently than another regarding the sale of 
liquor just because that restaurateur also happens to brew beer? 
Further, not allowing the sale of all types of alcohol brings up fears of the tied 
house all over again. Remember, tied houses are “establishments under contract 
 
175 See id. at 20 (“The distilled liquors are thus seen to be in a class by themselves, with an 
alcoholic strength far in excess of wines and beers. This difference should be made the basis of a 
radical difference in treatment under the law.”). 
176 Id. at 21. 
177 Id. at 22. 
178 See, e.g., Chris Bucher, Liquor License Helps Business Boom at Hops & Leisure, GMTODAY 
(Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.gmtoday.com/news/local_stories/2016/09222016-liquor-license-helps-business-
boom-at-hops-&-leisure.asp [https://perma.cc/FR4B-2CXQ] (discussing a brewpub in Oconomowoc, 
Wisconsin whose owner stated that the lack of a liquor license “dramatically hurt” his business and 
that his sales have been up 30% since he received one); Jonathan Kauffman, New S.F. Brew Pubs Head 
for Loophole in Liquor Licenses, S.F. CHRON., http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/New-S-F-brew-
pubs-head-for-loophole-in-liquor-6548504.php [https://perma.cc/544A-Z32Z] (last updated Oct. 4, 
2015, 12:02 PM) (quoting brewpub owners in San Francisco, who stated that a liquor license is necessary 
to “compete in a very competitive market”). 
179 Bryan Kristensen, What’s on Tap: ‘Golden Age of Craft Brewing’ Threatened by Restrictive Liquor 
Licensing, BADGER HERALD (Sept. 29, 2015), https://badgerherald.com/artsetc/2015/09/29/whats-on-tap-
golden-age-of-craft-brewing-threatened-by-restrictive-liquor-licensing [https://perma.cc/Q8GF-UED8]. 
180 See Daniel B. Kline, The Real Markup on Your Bar Tab Revealed, MOTLEY FOOL (Nov. 15, 
2014, 6:11 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/11/15/the-real-markup-on-your-bar-tab-
revealed.aspx [https://perma.cc/QAN8-K6L3] (explaining markups on alcohol in bars and restaurants 
and noting that liquor is the “worst deal for consumers”—thus, the most profitable for the restaurateur 
or bar owner). 
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to sell exclusively the product of one manufacturer.”181 By forcing bartenders to 
sell only one type of product, the only way to make more money is to sell more 
alcohol. This bare profit motive is thought to have caused most of society’s 
alcohol-related problems.182 Restricting brewpubs to selling only their beer is 
essentially legislating a tied house into existence. To alleviate that problem, 
brewpubs should be allowed to sell all types of alcohol. Such a legislative scheme 
may even be beneficial for states because of increased revenues from alcohol 
sales, food sales, and various business taxes. Since brewpubs make more profit by 
selling their own beer,183 they will sell their own beer in place of more 
intoxicating wine or liquor. This effectively replaces liquor consumption with 
beer consumption, something Fosdick and Scott thought was desirable.184 In 
short, brewpubs should be able to sell their own beer and other types of alcohol 
both to thwart the danger of a tied house and prevent financial ruin. 
Third, states should not limit the amount of beer brewed to arbitrarily low 
amounts. As a preliminary matter, states do not limit the production of craft 
breweries that are not linked to a restaurant.185 What rationale could a state 
possibly have to limit production just because a brewery is incidentally attached 
to a restaurant? One explanation comes from the story of Thomas Schlafly’s 
attempt to raise the barrelage limits for brewpubs in Missouri. Schlafly was 
immediately met with opposition by an Anheuser-Busch lobbyist who said that 
he “was seeking to make an inordinate amount of beer.”186 Anheuser-Busch 
emerged victorious, restricting Schlafly’s original demand of 60,000 barrels to 
only 10,000 barrels.187 Unreasonable opposition by other industry players is not 
a policy justification for barrelage limits for brewpubs. If states simply are 
concerned about breaking the three-tier system, legislators should realize that 
brewpubs are not meant to be limited to their bars, but are a means to grow a 
bigger business. More barrels and more sales benefit the state in terms of taxes, 
jobs, and tourism. States should treat brewpubs in the same way they treat 
breweries: no barrel limits. 
 
181 FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 47, at 29. 
182 See id. at 10 (outlining how the saloons’ “big profits” had “stimulated sales poverty and 
drunkenness”). 
183 See, e.g., ACITELLI, supra note 15, at 98 (quoting Bill Owens as saying that he makes double 
the profit on beer he brews and sells himself compared to beer he buys from others and sells). 
184 See FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 47, at 19-23 (recommending liberalization in the sale of 
light wines and beers to replace consumption of hard liquor). 
185 States may, however, impose larger fees or different licenses depending on size. See Barrel 
Cap Law, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/government-affairs/laws/barrel-cap-
laws [https://perma.cc/JC5X-7K7G] (presenting a fifty-state survey of state licensing laws for brewers). 
186 Welch, supra note 26, at 181 (quoting Missouri Compromise: State Legislature Will Raise Brewpub 
Production Ceiling to 10,000 Barrels, MOD. BREWERY AGE, May 24, 1993, at 1). 
187 Id. 
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Finally, at the very least, states should allow off-premises sales through 
six-packs, growlers, and “crowlers.”188 Again, selling beer was never technically 
a part of the three-tier system, which was meant to restrict liquor sales. 
Furthermore, once states have recognized the so-called exception of the 
brewpub, there is no legitimate control-reason to limit sales if a retailer would 
not be similarly limited. In other words, the state has already made the 
brewpub a combination of producer and retailer, so it should allow the 
brewpub to fully function as both. Off-premises sales provide start-up brewers 
direct distribution to customers, leading to decreased shipping costs and 
higher profit margins. Sales for consumption off-premises contribute solidly 
to a craft brewer’s bottom line and do not put the public at greater risk. With 
these five proposals, state governments can ensure the success of their craft 
brewers without breaking the three-tier system. Successful craft brewers 
bring a myriad of benefits—most importantly, innovation. 
CONCLUSION 
Craft brewing is one of the most innovative American industries in 
existence. It continues to grow exponentially and create much-needed jobs in 
the American economy. While it may continue to grow without a decrease in 
regulation, it cannot achieve its true potential without certain, commonsense 
changes to the regulatory environment. New recipes will be created, but, without 
legislative changes, the world may miss out on the new recipe that changes the 
entire fabric of the brewing industry. 
To create a more conducive environment for innovation, the only needed 
changes are lower taxes on the smallest brewers and a reasonable state system 
for starting and growing brewpubs. This will create more financially stable 
brewers. Even better, none of these commonsense proposals challenge the 
current values of the federal taxation system or the state control systems. 
Whether Americans want to challenge the eighty-year-old research, ideas, 
and philosophy that motivated state governments in the mob-dominated 
post-Prohibition period can be left for another day.189 Luckily, with these 
proposals, we do not have to wait that long to enjoy tasty, refreshing, and 
innovative brews. 
 
188 See supra note 173. 
189 See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 61, at 82 (arguing that the legislation of the period immediately 
following Repeal was essentially based on class drinking trends, reflecting “the drinking habits of the 
population more than any overriding presumptions about moral behavior,” and that “[t]he difference in 
type of alcoholic beverage and the realities surrounding its manufacture, transportation, and clientele were 
reflected in the development of each sector of the control systems that emerged across the country”). 
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